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Why does the theory of economic integration as it now 
stands appear largely irrelevant to actual economic union 
proposals and institutions, particularly to those outside 
Eastern Europe? To what extent does its abstraction from 
socio-political concerns and its potentially simpliste 
assumptions about the nature of governmental concern with 
economic policy limit its usefulness? To what extent are 
these weaknesses the result of a faulty analytical approach, 
of inappriate institutional and structural assumptions, and 
to what of incompleteness rather than error or unrealism? 
The examination of these questions is not, as mpy, 
appear at first glance of purely academic (olH^aogogic) 
interest. The reformulation of economic union theory to 
create nore useful applied analytical tools will be much 
sounder if the lack of cutting power and gaps in the present 
-tool list are better understood. Moreover, given the 
substantial body of theoretical - analytical formulations 
existing to start <a noveau without any attempt to see what 
concepts and lines ol' attack are useful or usefully modifiable 
would be misplaced inventiveness of a high order. 
The theory of economic integration,arose as a branch 
of Vinerian tariff and neo-pigivian welfare economics. Despite 
fairly extensive recent refinement, it retains many of the 
more limiting and artificial characteristics of its origins. 
Four of the most crucial of these ares use of comparative 
static and marginal, not dynamic and structural, analysis, 
assumption of a negative (permissive) rather than a positive 
(directive) role for economic policy, adoption of a functional 
rather than institutional policy evaluation framework, and 
explicit or implicit use of assumptions based on the "special 
case" of industrial economies. 
Use of semi-comparative static analysis contrasting 
the situation with and without economic union at a given 
time has the result of placing emphasis on gains or losses 
from static efficiency and resource allocation considerations. 
To the extent the gains (or costs) from ecohomic union arise 
out of increased rates of growth either in resource utilization 
or in production efficiency they tend to be overloaded or 
treated as side effects. At best one has the median taxenomic 
approach to marshallian comparative statics which is highly 
cumbersome and certainly ill adopted for considering growth 
as an integral part of models. 
Moroever, the limitations of this approach are increased 
by the use of a modified Ricardin - or simplistic 
Ohlin - model in regard to comparative advantage. Advantages 
in production are assumed either to result from basically 
unchanging factor endowment ' characteristics or from economies 
of scale. Given the standard assumptions of perfect competition 
and mobility of the location of production, these will be 
* This paper is one of three attempting a reformulation of 
economic integration analysis in terms more relevant to 
non-industrial economies. The first (EDRP 81) provides 
a tentative formulation of the potential relevance of economic 
unions to achieving and sustaining rapid growth under african 
economic conditions. The third will attempt specific applica-
tion of the approach set., out in the initial pair to East African 
economic union questions. 
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be mutually reinforcing within a common market. Specialization 
- and intramarket trade flow - will increase 04 the basis 
of natural comparative advantage determined location of optimal 
..production units, 
Entirely apart from questions as to the validity of 
the comparative and mobility assumptions this approach fails 
to face the question of whether and to what extent comparative 
advantage (even if based on factor quality and supply as 
defined by Heckscher and Ohlin) is created rather than inherent. 
If it is created then productive location within a common 
market will have a decided tendency to reinforce historic 
patterns of created advantage whether these are optimal in 
* a real resource utilization or growth sense or not. 
Further the acceptance and reinforcement of historic created 
comparative advantage as a basis for allocation of production 
: is likely to increase both income level and growth disparities 
within the economic union. Free movement of labour and invest-
ment within the common market - as assumed in the model -
would increase the polarizing tendencies regionally, albeit 
possibly damping them on a per capita basis. 
Finally, the analysis implicitly assumes changes in' the 
market structure of production and consumption - though 
possibly not of extra market trade - will be marginal. The 
same real resoucres are to be allocated more efficiently 
resulting in higher outputs but not in any great change in the 
distribution of output by sector or industry. In other words 
one has virtually a Walrasian eqiulibrium type growth in which 
all the output figures are multiplied by a fixed coefficient. 
Alternatively, the result could be viewed as an input-outpuo 
system in which a more or less uniform reduction in input 
•coefficients allowed a consistent expansion of output. 
When combined with the standard assumptions of factor 
mobility between uses in any one of the uniting economies and 
of mobility of labour and capital amohg them this Walrasian 
eqiulibrium approach totally abstracts not only from questions 
of changed production or demand patterns for the union as a 
whole,but also from adjustment and factor redeployment problems 
in the smaller units® 
This approach is not inherently unreasonable for 
flexible economies with broadly based structures of production. 
Changes in total output are likely to be marginal for the 
economic union and the increase in output per head not such as 
to alter the patterns of demand. The instantaneous adjustment 
assumption is unrealistic but given probable changes in 
location of productive activity the redeployment problem would 
not be severe in a growing economy with a reasonably flexible 
and mobile labour force., 
However, this analysis does not deal with the case in 
which a major proposed gain from economic union is the creation 
of a market adequate.to support new lines of activity. Under 
these conditions the structure of production will alter sub-
stantially if the market unificati®n proves successful. Such 
structural alterations are likely to have substantial effects 
both on utilization of resources and on growth rates. The first 
of these problems is abstracted from in the Walrasian equilibrium 
approach which assumes both continuous full employment and 
totally (or predominantly) intra-market financing of investment 
Analytical concerns have tended to be permissive rather than 
directive in that the operational frqmework for economic policy 
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assumed or implied has been Marshallian neo-laissez faire? 
The approach is negative in the sense of removing barriers 
to efficient private utilization of resources rather than 
positive in the sense of creating posibilities more effective 
planned or directive resource allocation. 
Several conditions are necessary for this approach to 
be relevant. First the economies must be basically private 
sector in orientation with public economic policy and 
expenditure supporting and national planning indicative and 
inducive. Second there must be workable competition (however 
defined) to ensure that resource reallocation does take place 
and that economies of scale are realized.** A stricter 
formulation of this condition is that whatever divergences from 
perfect competition exist must not be such as to alter materially 
the optimum resource allocation (post union) which would result 
under perfectly competitive conditions. Third the changes in 
production and productive location required must be consistent -
in scale and time horizon - with private resources and decision 
making outlook(either initially or subject to secondary state 
inducement and support programmes). Fourth private and public 
costs and benefits accruing from union induced changes must 
be not only in the same direction but substantially equivalent. 
Whether these conditions are met in any particular case 
is a matter of fact. It is worth noting that the third and 
fourth are more likely to be satisfied if the changes entailed 
by union are marginal and the required adjustment period short. 
To the extent the first condition is not met analysis assuming 
it is likely to be irrelevant while to the extent the others 
are not met actual results are likely to diverge from those 
analytically projected *** 
The neo-laissez faire characteristic of economic union 
analysis leads both logically and practically to a functional 
(or specific) rather than a structural (or comprehensive) view 
of economic policy. In practice - albeit with considerably 
less logical justification - this characteristic appears to 
hold true of most CMEA oriented socialist analytical work. 
* Clearly this characteristic is not relevant to CMEA (COMECON) 
oriented analytical writing. However appear to be very few 
serious pieces on the basic purposes and operations of an 
economic unifying at coordinating body among socialist 
economies. What articles the author has seen are extremely 
tentative and limited precisely because they tend to think 
of economic union as implying common "free" market and 
therefore inconsistent with C Gil o 1 planning. Realization 
that the presumptive parallel to a Common Market among 
"free market" economies is a Common Plan among centrally 
planned economies is apparently recent and incomplete. In 
any event CMEA and its literature have had minimal impact 
on analytical formulation, proposals, and policies for 
t iers jaqnderegional economic cooperation and unification. 
**EEC's attempts to unify and bolster anti-cartel legislation 
and the British Conservative Interest in EEC membership as a 
competitive spur to efficiency are examples of policies and 
concerns consistent with and to some extent deriving from 
this analytical point. 
***The European Iron and Steel Community illustrates such 
divergence. The combination of national planning (and 
employment) imperatives, cartellization, and the scope of 
changes both in -resources and time required has resulted in 
substantially slower and lesser alterations in productive 
location and scale and lower gains in efficiency than,would have 
been the case had the four assumptions been fully met. 
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Since policies are regarded as aimed at removing 
particular obstacles to8or providing certain incentives for, 
private action within a basically private, workably 
competitive, market economy they are seen as limited in scope 
and specific in orientation. This outlook is, of course, 
reinforced by the assumption that the changes with which 
the market and its component economies are faced are marginal 
and the resource redeployment problems limited in amplitude 
and period. 
If the conditions for a neo-laissea faire analytical 
framework are not met there is a strong case for a comprehensive 
approach to policy and institutional effects of an economic 
union. This- case is' logically irrefutable if the economies 
involved are, in fact, basically public plan rather than private 
market economies?- Economic integration would then 'be regarded 
as a process designed to attain ccrtain ends and an overall 
optimal institutional and policy framework would be formulated 
for the purpose of their attainment. Specific policy and 
institutional additions and alterations would be designed to 
adjust the present framework to that envisaged as most appropriate 
for the desired operation of the economic union. 
The structural and institutional assumptions underlying 
economic union analysis arethose of what Dudley Seers has aptly 
termed "the special case", the developed industrial economies. 
Some of these assumptions - more often implicitly the explicitly 
formulated - have been noted above. Four"additional structural 
assumptions are usual. 
First,relationships among different sectors of the economy are 
taken to be numerous, quantitatively significant, and.sub-
stantially more important than international linkages. Second, 
substantial economic flexibility in use (or mobility; of factors 
of production both geographically and among different economic 
units or activities is assumed. Therefore even substantial 
alteration of production to meet changes in demand or relative 
costs is possible without radical price shifts, severe and last-
ing bottlenecks, or substantial long term unemployment. Third, 
the pattern of production is taken to be roughly balanced in 
relation to national demand. Obviously, autarchy is not 
assumed, rather that the bulk of the output of all major 
economic sectors and most individual lines of production is 
home market directed while the bulk of national demand for 
most products and all major sectors is met from national 
output. Fourth, output levels and growth rates are viewed, 
as primarily internally generated and internally sustainable 
in the sense that national demand is central in calling forth 
both short run use of productive capacity and long run invest-
ment in additional capacity. Furthermore, growth is substantial-
ly domestically sustainable in the real sense because of the 
existence of substantial intermediate and capital goods 
production capacity and of corporate and public savings flows 
sufficient to sustain high levels of productive investment. 
In short the uniting, economies are assumed to be 
nationally integrated, flexible, and capable of self generated 
and self sustained growth. These assumptions are largely 
appropriate for at least most European economies, the United 
States, Canada, and (with rather more qualifications) China. 
* This definition-is admitedly imprecise. The more presence 
of a "plan" does not make an economy planned. The degree 
of state control over specific private economic decisions - i n 
particular investment and output levels and international 
transactions - and the relative share and role of public 
investment, especially in large scale directly,productive 
activities, are probably the critical criteria. 
They are likely to lead to faulty conclusions when applied to 
economies dependent on primary product export•proceeds for 
a .substantial share of their national product, investible 
surplus, command over manufactured products and/or supplies 
of machinery and investment goods. 
II. 
The particular analytical emphasis of economic union 
theory are"closely related to its special characteristics 
and assumptions. These are global welfare effects (i.e. 
the relative effects of trade creation and distortion), static 
resource allocation and scale economies, and particular 
policy modifications necessary for effective operation of 
a common market. Two. more recent concerns - often vaguely 
if at all, lirked to the remainder of the analysis - have_ 
been growth reinforcement and vertical integration of 
primary producing units with a central industrial common 
market. 
The welfare analysis has tended to be either neo-'pigovian 
or in terms of the Scitovsky "bribe potential" criterion. 
A common market is held to be justified if gains in. welfare 
(measured in terms of additional real consumptive capac ity) 
to the uniting states exceed losses to the rest of the "world. 
In other words if total world output - physical - is increased 
then it is accepted that the common market has increased 
global welfare because (given the basically unchanged product-
ive structure of the union) transfers to losing states 
equalling their losses could be made out of common market 
member gains. No assumption that such transfers will take 
place is made and no attention is paid to questions of the 
union's effect on equality of global union distribution.^ 
Evaluation of the conditions under which the conditions 
for a net gain will be met hSs centered on trade creation vs 
trade diversion. In general)the criterion is that if the 
gains on trade created among union members (new trade value 
times average saving per unit) exceeds the loss on trade 
diverted from outside sources to market members (diverted 
trade value times average loss per unit*) the global welfare 
(output) effects will be positive. As may be noted this 
assumes full employment of factors of production throughout 
both in the common market and in outside economies. 
Even at this level, certain ambiguities - or cases 
assumed to be qf secondary importance and mentioned at best 
in passing - arise. Trade diversion cannot be costed (or 
quantified) in terms of total imports shifted because of 
tariff discrimination times pre-union cost differences. Post 
union costs for the market member exporter.and pre-union for the 
outside must be used to evaluate added "diverted trade" cost. 
Otherwise the analysis will abstract from economies ...of scale 
which might substantially reduce costs in the union member 
expanding production and raise them in the market losing 
outsider. Especially if the joining economies are both" 
individually small (say each under $1 billion money sector 
national product) and relatively far from outside sources of 
supply, the scale effect may swamp the apparent pre-union data 
* The "loss" on some of the "diverted" imports might be negative. 
This would be true if higher pre-union tariffs against union 
members had, in fact, diverted imports to outsider;-, sources. 
A number of such cases might well arise in West Africa were 
the Anglophonic and EEC Associate states to form a common 
market. For example a number of Nigerian'exports including 
be er,•confectionery, and probably cement, shoes, plastic 
goods, and plywood and .finished lumber are kept out of. 
Cameroonian markets by the tariff structures heavy preference 
to EEC and A ssocia te suppliers. 
-6-
based diversionary effect. Unfortunately in this case, 
"diverted trade" cost does not represent global gains or 
losses. Nor will the gains or losses of the market and 
outsiders necessarily be equal and opposite, indeed both 
could loose or the market gain and the outside suffer no loss 
if it suffurred no economy of scale losses and could 
immediately redeploy its resources to equally productive 
uses. Assuming full employment and efficient resource 
allocation throughout, formulas for computing market added 
real resource cost ( DCW), outside added real resource cost 
( DC ) and global addeci resource cost ( DC^) can be 
writtSns g 
1 * D G m = < C M T - % (°ML- CM2> 
2" DC 0 = D (Co2- C o l) 
3. D C g = D C m + DC o 
DC and DC„ can be > 0 Hi s^ 
DC„ can be 
0 V 
T^ = trade diverted 
^Ml= pre-union unit cost 
Cj^- market post-union unit (scale effect) 
CQ^= outsider pre-union unit cost 
C02b outsider post-union unit cost (scale effect) 
D-, = market pre-union output of goods- affected by 
trade diversion. 
D = outsider pre and post union output for home use and 
non-market export of goods affected by trade diversion 
To the extent that D^ is large relative to T-^  and/or C M 2 i s 
substantially below C™-, DC™ is likely to be small or 
negative. ' 
To the extent that D is large relative to T^ , and/or C 2' i s substantially above C dC^ is likely toHDe large. 
Ceteris_peribus the larger D^ and D are in relation to T-p the 
less the C 2 will diverge from the C ^ 
The. smaller D^ is to T-^  and D the greater the relative change 
nf +hp n • m e i s l i k e l y t 0 b e i n rQiation to that of the C . ' •• O o « 
Operationally, this suggests that, a union among small 
economies with substantial (protected.) inefficient production 
and imports substantial relative to that productionfbut not to 
supplier output)may well result in a negative DC™ and 
an insignificant D C even though the computed "trade 
diversion" cost is positive and large. This conclusion - which 
is of evident relevance to Africa - is strengthened if the 
market results in net resource inflows or fuller employment 
of existing resources in the market economies while not 
substantially effecting employment levels outside, These 
conditions are likely to be met if the market members are 
small relative to their trading partners and have import levels 
largely determined by export plus resource transfer flows not 
by national income levels per se. 
This is in fact, the position of African states vis a vis 
their external trading partners. 
Similarly the evaluation in terms of trade creation and 
diversion tends to place little emphasis on income effects. 
If market members joint product is substantially higher after 
union then a spillover trade effect benefitting outside 
economies is almost certain. This would certainly reduce 
- and might reverse - the initial diversionary effect costs.* 
This can be viewed as. a secondary trade creation effect. 
On the other had if the resource redeployment in the outside 
economies results in lower real output after union then a 
"trade destruction" effect will increase the diversion losses. 
As a first approximation it seems true that the relative sizes 
of the positive and negative income effects are likely to be 
proportional to the direct trade creation - diversion gains 
and losses as modified to take scale considerations into 
account. Again, however, the smaller the market in relation 
to its outside trading partners the more 'likely its redeploy-
ment gains are to be substantial and the partner redeployment 
losses minimal and,therefore,the net real income effects on 
trade resulting from static redeployment and scale changes are 
to be positive. 
As the foregoing partial amendments to standard trade 
diversion - creation analysis indicate, two frighteningly 
unrealistc assumptions remain. First, by assuming full 
employment in all economies throughout, the possibilities both 
of creating factor employment possibilities and of facing 
unemployment of former export producing factors in the - market 
and outside economies respectively is ignored. Second, by 
taking a comparative static view of output and trade levels the 
effects of economic union on growth rates both of national 
product and of trade is left outside the analysis although 
they could completely alter the static gain and loss calculation 
within a relatively short period. 
The next stage in the analysis has usually been to 
determine what pre-union production patterns are likely to 
result in predominantly trade diversionary and predominantly 
trade creating patterns. Here substantial confusion has 
arisen partly, perhaps, because of the basically static and 
marginal approach to productive structures. There is general 
agreement that the union of complementary economies, will 
maximize the share of diverted trade in total intramarket 
transactions while uniting competitive economies will tend 
to maximize the share of created trade. Both trade diversion 
and trade creation will be lessened to the extent the uniting 
economies were there own major trading partners before as well 
as other common market creation. 
Somewhat ironically this suggests that ceteris paribus a 
globally beneficial common market will result Trf less added-
market trade and minimal impact on market - outside trade. 
Admitedly this probability reinforces the appropriateness of.the 
marginal change assumption noted earlier. One difficulty 
with this presentation of complementarity and competitivity 
is that it does not specify whether the member production 
structures are competitive before or after equilibrium. Further 
it fails to distinguish whether competitiveness - and to lesser 
degree or irrelevant nature. If the production structures 
of the uniting economies are dominated by export commodities 
not substantially consumed in any of the market members the 
* It seems unlikely to reverse them assuming full employment 
before union. To do so would require very large gains in 
efficiency in the common market and more productive average 
resource utilization in the outside ©conomies go long as 
one holds total resource employment constant. 
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complementarity or competitivity is irrelevant as no 
substantial intra-market trade can result unless the total 
market structure of production is altered by union. Proposed 
unions of primary export dominated economies are cases in 
point, the diversity or homogeneity if member country's export 
patterns is quite irrelevant to the potential gains from 
intra-union trade. 
The more recent position is that substantial gains are 
likely if the economies joining are intially competitive but 
will, after 'onion, become complementary. In other words this 
formulation recognizes that significant gains are possible only 
if intra-market trade and individual economy alterations of 
productive structure are relatively large. However this state-
ment still assumes significant pre-union trade among the 
economies. If this is absent, the condition for substantial 
market gains is that the union results in significant intra-
market trade in goods not previously produced in the market 
economies or in significantly lower costs of.production for 
goods previously produced for national markets behind very high 
protective tariff walls but now produced at substantial economies 
of scale for the joint market. The former conditions are 
particularly relevant in Africa or Southeast Asia and the latter 
in Latin America. Global gains are likely if the market's 
external trade level is not significantly below that of its 
pre-union component states. However, this means that the new 
output represents not only a relative shift in the structure 
of production but also substantial expansion of certain lines 
of production without countervailing contractions to release 
resources. Therefore either pre-union full employment or 
the absence of significant outside - market resources flows 
must be relaxed. This is scarcely a surprising conclusion as 
one of the basic arguments for protection - whether national 
or regional - is that it allows previously unemployed (or 
unemployable) resources to be utilized while attracting 
complementary resources from abroad. Equally, it is quite 
consistent that it should be of particular significance in the 
case of small primary export specialized economies with sluggish 
dependence on external capital sources. 
Curiously enough, distribution of gains and losses within the 
common market has received substantially less analytical 
attention. Either it assumed that gains and losses will be so 
distributed that all members will automatically benefit or that 
some redistribution mechanism - whether in terms of factor 
movements or fiscal transfers - will result. While admitedly 
consistent with a neo-laissey faire economic framework these 
assumptions appear to be unrealistic. Both the experiences 
of widening regional disparities within long united economies, 
e.g. the Appalachian Region in the United States, the 
Mezzogiorno in Italy, the Northeast in Brazil, and of common 
market operational difficulties e.g. EEC, East Africa suggest 
that what Hicks' terms centrifugal or centralizing tendencies 
are likely to be dominant in an economic union. It will be pure 
chance if each member hi.s an equivalent (to G-NP before union) 
share of the centres. Especially in a union which is relatively 
small, involving radical changes in the joint (as well as member) 
structure of production, substantial intervention in regard to 
location of production or significant income transfers are likely 
to be necessary for each member to have net gains much less for 
gains to be equivalent (either in relation to national product 
or to population) in each member. 
The second conern of analysis has been the nature of the 
static gains resulting from a common market. These are seen 
as falling under the broad category of specialization in 
production with more complete adherence to real comparative 
advantage and economies of scale the significant sub-
categories. 
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The limitations involved in the Ricardian or simplistic 
Heckscher - Ohlin typo definition of comparative advantages 
in factor use as natural and permanent have already 
been noted. Similarly attention has been drawn to the 
inadequate consideration of scale effects on gains and 
losses within (and outside) the common market. 
Analysis of the pattern of particular policy changes „ 
needed to permit the efficient operation of competitive 
forces within a common market has proceeded on a taxonomic 
basis. Perhaps predictably the intial - and in many 
respects still the best - treatment is that of J.E. Meade, 
Problems of Economic Union. There is broad agreement 
on the need for harmonization of taxation and labour 
payment levels and of joint action to further competition 
and increase factor mobility. Divergences arise on the 
degree of specific tax, wage, social benefit, and 
competition inducing unification required exist but 
appear to be of secondary significance,* Two critical 
points which do emerge - albeit in some studies blurred 
by the myriad particular cases treated - are that broadly 
parallel economic legislation over a wide range of ma.jor 
areas and substantial faith in the future actions of 
partners (including continued adherence to the common 
market) are essential for the viable functioning of 
even a neo-laissez faire economic union. 
Growth stimulation or reinforcement has bocome 
an analytical concern because of its significance among 
the considerations leading to the Treaty of Rome and 
the apparently substantial impact EEC has had in this 
regard. The difficulty of integrationing this aspect into 
the basically static analytical model has tended to be 
sidestepped by considering the change as a once for 
all increase in growth rates resulting from more efficient 
resource allocation and economies of scale. The reasons 
posited are that lower costs increase competitivity 
of output in world markets and therefore export growth 
as well as rasing profits creating both higher marginal 
efficiency of capital and the investible surpluses to 
carry out the longer desired invetment programme. The 
profit effect will tend to be self-fulfilling in that 
higher expected profits will lead to higher desired 
investment as well as increased foreign capital inflows 
(if for no other reason to protect established markets 
as re US and UK firms' additions to production capacity 
in the Six) and thus increase ex post demand as well 
as capacity. This line of analysis require relaxing 
the continuous full employment assumption as well as 
the negligible market - outside productive capital flows 
assumption. In most forms it also implies an expected 
shift in the basic market - outside balance of trade 
position which is - aparently assumed to be both stable 
and in balance before and after union in the main body, 
of analysis. 
* EEC experience is on the side of those who argue 
broad equivalence; in broad, areas rather than specific 
policy uniformity. 
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Analysis - or rationalization? - of the effects of 
union between a central - industrial economy common market 
and a group of peripheral primary producers also received 
substantial stimulation from EEC and its Associate member 
policies*,, Eurafrican and related proposals have sought to 
develop on analytical base showing mutual gain through 
lower cost primary product supplies and stronger export 
markets to the centre and higher primary product prices 
and larger investment flows for the periphery. 
The inconsistency in regard to primary product prices is 
obvious but secondary. The union of a group of industrial 
and a "roup of primary producing economies in a common 
market is the classic case of dominance of trade diversion 
effects with negative global welfare effects. Primary 
exports cannot benefit except by discrimination against 
lower cost outside producers. Neither can industrial exports 
within the market be expanded except at the expense of lower 
cost outside industrial economies and the primary producers. 
The classic hothouse protection case arises. If gains and 
losses are divided equally both the centre and the perphery 
are likely to'loose by the resultant inflated cost structure 
and by a clear reduction of competitive pressures for greater 
efficiency either at any given time or over time. 
In practice,one would not expect the losses to be 
shared in a ratio equivalent to national products but to fall 
more heavily on the peripheral members (or Associates). 
Their trade t'o monetary product ratios are likely to be 
higher and their bargaining pwer less. Moreover the union-
even with safeguards - is likely to reduce their ability 
to develop lines of production competitive with those of 
the centre economies, especially if these are their chief 
sources of. investment funds. 
EEC - Associate experience does little to challenge 
the appropriateness of these analj^tical conclusions. The 
special provisions built in to the arms length Greek and 
Turkish Association agreements as opposed to their relative 
absence from the ex-colonial ones strongly suggests that the 
latter are net loosers from Association except to the extent 
it augments their global capital importing capacity. 
Admitedly Association with EEC did widen the range of 
"Economic union" import sources from the ex-colonial power 
to the Six but, by the same token, this was a less advantageous 
change than would have resulted from - say - a most favoured 
nation tariff policy.** 
* It can be argued quite plansilly that much of the literature 
on the economics of' imperialism deals precisely with this 
topic. However, both the assumptions and the areas of 
special concern tended to be different e.g. dynamic 
growth effects, unemployment and employment changes, 
and investment flows were always significant in colonial-
imperial analysis. Moreover socio-political considerations 
and the actual institutional patterns of the colonial 
periphery-received rather more attention. On the other 
hand,the analysis itself was often loose or shoddy' and 
often e.g. Hobson, Luxemburg quite inadequately supported 
by the data cited. Only since 1955 has there emerged any 
substantial interaction between analysis of industrial 
centre - colonial or dependent periphery economic relations 
and that of economic union. 
** In any event, the loss of French import subsidies on 
primary products entailed by the lower EEC protective 
duties against outsiders more than offsets this gain. 
At the same time, it lowers the centre's loss from tihe 
t^ nion albeit by raising that of all members except 
France. 
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The analytical model appears even less relevant 
to any proposed Asian economic union. With the exception 
of India (Japan and China do not figure in any of the 
proposals) the economics are basically irrelevantly 
competitive and/or complementary.* For an economic union 
not involving India to have a significant impact, massive 
changes in the union structure of production are needed 
and the gains from union would arise if, and to the extent, 
it made possible and resulted in development along these 
lines. In India were in the union, special problems would 
arise as in a laissez fairc- common market virtually all 
large scale industry would tend to gravitate to hef larger 
base market and much more advanced industrial foundation. 
Africa is nearly a pure case of non-applicability 
of the institutional—structural assumptions. Certainly 
neither the continued existence of the East African Common 
Market nor the creation of any additional or broader one 
will depend significantly either on global gain and loss 
considerations or on static resource allocational efficiency 
within basically unchanged productive structures. Nor -
given even joint market sizes - can competition be viewed as 
a very hopeful prime mover even in the economies with loose 
or ineffectual planning mechanisms. 
A number of the analytical limitations can be removed 
either by substituting more appropriate structural and 
institutional assumptions or by adding specific consideration 
of dynamic effects. Indeed, the previous discussion of the 
existing theory has pointed to a number of instances in which 
such additions or modifications appear to involve relatively 
minor effort. 
Before proceeding with an attempt to apply, and in the process 
to modify, the'analytical apparatus to African economic union 
considerations, it is necessary to re-examine the relation-
ships between economic union and broader economic aims as 
well as the socio-political ends toward the attainment of 
which",economic programmes are presumably (and properly) 
means, 
Standard customs union analysis is based on the promise 
that maximization of current national product through, more 
efficient resource use is the dominant (or only) goal. 
In so doing it abstracts from growth rate, trade balance 
employment and unemployment, and structural or institutional 
change which are often significantly more important from 
a national policy formulation viewpoint. 
Further, by assuming continuous trade balance with imports 
determined by the size of national product and continuous 
full employment of factors, the analysis is able to define 
trade diversion as unambiguously harmful and its minimization 
as a goal. In the case of economies dependent on capital 
imports for much of their domestic fixed investment and . 
with substantial resources unemployed or unemployable in 
existing lines of pre-union production trade diversion 
may in fact have positive global and market effects on 
real output. 
* There is, in fact, .substantial intra- ECAFE trade even 
excluding Japan. Apart from Indian manufactured goods 
exports, however, it consists predominantly of Burmese 
• and Thai rice exports. The reasons why economic union 
might effect these are rather different from those 
posited in the standard analysis. 
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Examination of the primary concerns of economic union 
analysis, in summation, bears out Raymond Mikesell's 
judgement ? 
By and large the theory of customs unions has-
been confined to consideration of welfare gains 
and losses arising from a disturbance of the 
existing patterns of trade. 
Moreover, it has done so in a static frame. Neither 
resource supply and utilization, market productive 
structure, nor dynamic growth rate effects have 
received more than peripheral attention. 
Ill 
Considered in its own terms, the present body of 
economic union theory seems of doubtful relevance to 
any economic union except one among neo-laissez faire 
industrialized economies. Even for such a union its • 
abstruction from resource employment and unemployment, 
dynamic efficiency, transitional, and period, and intra-
union income distributional effects would appear to render 
it seriously incomplete. 
These limitations are least for EEC. However, 
what sketchy computations exist suggest that static allocation 
and scale economy efficiency gains cannot be very substantial 
relative to national product even in this case. The more 
recent "growth reinforcement" case with its recognition of 
non-full employment considerations, institutional influences 
on investment decisions and international investment flows 
seems of substantially greater explanatory power. 
EFTA - which is in any event a loose free trade area 
rather far from becoming a thoroughgoing common market - is 
a special case because its existence and policies are 
largely reflex reactions to EEC. Use of existing analysis 
would suggest EFIA's economic impact is minimal - a 
conclusion in accord with empirical evident. 
None of the institutional and neo-laissez faire 
framework assumptions hold for CMEA (COMECON). Certainly 
its effects are most unlikely to be the result of freely 
operating competitive market forces. Furthermore, there 
is a very substantial divergence in the basic characteristics 
of the member economies from predominantly industrial 
Czechoslovakia and economically massive Soviet Union to 
primary product dependent, economically small Bulgaria. 
However, potential static efficiency anrl scale considerations 
are almost certainly considerably more relevant in CMEA's 
case than in EEC's, 
Latim American economies fit neither the structural 
nor the institutional assumptions of the analytical frame. 
They are heavily primary export dependent - at least for 
financing capital and industrial input goods-; and the major 
ones are-neo-mercantilist rather than neo-laissez faire. 
Moreover, the range in economic size and structure of pro-
duction between e.g. Brazil and Paraguay is far greater 
than the model assumes. However, as with CMEA the scope 
for increased static allocational and scale efficiency gains 
is large albeit less significant than the possible growth 
creating effects of market unification. 
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If the uniting economies pre-union imports wore determined by 
primary export levels plus capital transfers rather than 
national product levels per se., the entire concept of 
trade diversion becomes ambiguous. While the import pattern-
of the union will diverge from that of its pre-union members, 
imports from outside economies are likely to rise not fall 
because additional capital inflows induced by the new internal 
economic opportunities add to import capacity. Traditional 
export proceeds (and their growth) are unlikely to be sub-
stantially determined by the rate of growth of new sectors 
of production in the early stagec. of structural changes 
because there is relatively little direct competitions for 
scarce factors of production.* 
Global welfare analysis presupposes both direct one 
to one comparability of national gains and losses and global 
concerns on the Part ef policy makers. At least in the case 
of economic unions anon.', poor v countries both are 
fallocious. An addition to African (or Asian or Latin America 
or Middle Eastern) national product "balanced" by an equal 
loss'to Europe and North America would represent a clear gain 
in global welfare terms under any reasonable weighting of 
equity or marginal utility considerations, Further a sub-
stantial e.g. 10$ gain'to Africa totally at the expense of 
outsiders would mean only 1/5/° loss to outside economies 
because of their far greater absolute magnitude. A 1/5$ 
loss in national product is of an order of magnitude easily 
handled by national economic policy and indeed is swamped 
within one year by any plausible growth rate.** 
* This may no longer hold once a substantial industrial 
sector is established especially if wage rates rise. 
Certainly it is not argued that faulty import capacity 
allocation may not harm primary export sectors but such 
allocation is neither unique to economic union nor 
inherent in it. On the"other hand, the rate of growth 
of extra-market export proceeds will be a significant 
determinant factor in the rate of structural"change as 
well as of extra-market import growth. Comparative 
South Asian studies by Dr. Pauuw and by the autnor show, 
success in raising and sustaining traditional export 
proceeds is closely correllated with achieving development 
ba^ed on structural change vide the cases of the 
Phillippines, Malaya, and Thailand vs those of Burma and 
Ceylon. The letter's failure to expand their export 
bases has largely contributed to their failure to attain 
structural change despite protectionist policies 
verging on attempted neo-autarchy and certainly far more 
draconic than those pursued by the achievements in both 
the primary export and industrial sectors. 
** The impact on particular industries will of course 
be larger, however even here the maximum plausible 
losses will be smaller than those routinely faced from, 
internal technological shifts or even minor recessions. 
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A Wf° gain foregone is a very different matter. Moreover, 
as noted above both the market and outside effects are 
likely to be positive. 
Whatever the force of global welfare considerations 
on trade policy formulation by rich economies - and the 
history of Q-AT.T IMF, ESC, UNCI AD, and various agricultural 
subsidy and declining industry employment protection 
measures•leave one distinctly sceptical, not to say 
cynical - it is both unrealistic and unreasonable to 
expect African - or other tiers monde - economies to 
give them any substantial weight. National economic 
policy is determined on the basis of (real or assumed) 
national (or politically powerful sectoral) economic 
interests subject to outside pressures. Global welfare 
is significant only if a national economy is so massive 
that the secondary feedback of its policy measures 
affecting the economies of other states is quantitatively 
large. Certainly this is true of no African state and -
except for a limited number of; commodity markets - would 
not be true of Africa as whole.* 
More broadly the global gains and losses approach 
inherently views customs unions as generalized - and, if 
increasing global welfare, rationalized forme of bilateralism. 
Common market creation is, in short, seen from the member 
point of.view as an exercise in optimum tariff cum bilateral 
discrimination formulation and from the global standpoint 
as an inferior "second best" substitute for free trade. 
• A stronger case can be made for intra - tiers monde 
welfare effects. For example, industrializationTHrough 
import substituting against other poor economies is 
uncle sire able if regional solutions are possible 
Massive diversification by all primary producers into 
each other's staple exports is - pace the IBRD ! -
likely_to be .mutually disastrous. In fact, tiers monde 
economies do recognize these sub-global welfare 
considerations at least to the extent of seeking 
litigating or reversing them vide the SSTCTAD 
75" and JiCA, ECLA, and ECAFE discussions? 
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This is hardly the way any African state views, or 
can reasonably be expected to view, economic union.* 
No general assault on the value of analysis based 
on simplified or special assumptions is intended. Such 
analysis cans (a)'isolate the working of a particular 
force, (b) provide a clearer understanding of a simple 
(simpliste) form of an issue from which a broader view 
can be built by relaxing assumptions; (c) serve as-a 
pedogogical device. However, to believe one can proceed 
to direct application of such an analytical model to 
specific problems in political economy is rather analogous 
to a person attempting to apply the action conclusions 
of a logical, but not totally realistic, cosmos such as 
Tolkien's to his daily life. 
Governments are rarely, if ever, interested in 
economic policy as an end. Economic policy and projects 
are seen as means to attaining social and/or political 
ends. 
* If two conditions were met there might well be a good • 
deal to be said for the analytical viewpoint. However, 
to state the preconditions, is to illustrate just how 
far reality - present or probable - diverges from them;-
1. World tariff policy would be such as to give 
equal access to processed and finished products 
based on raw materials as to the unprocessed raw 
materials themselves. In support, infant economy 
preferences would be extended to encourage the 
growth of comparatively advantageous lines of 
processing and manufacture in present primary 
export economies; 
2. National "full employment promoting" monetary policies 
would be extended to the international level" so 
that otherwise viable development would not be 
choked off or distarted by foreign exchange bottle-
necks inherently beyond national control loans 
(which would in the end flow back in lender exports 
to borrowers) would not be viewed as "aid" any"more 
(or any less) than national deficit financing or 
credit easing policies to combat recession one viewed 
as "aid" to the otherwise unemployed workers or semi-
employed plants. 
African (and other tiers monde) states have, 
of course, argued for such international trade and 
finance structural changes. However, despite the 
support of an growing number of applied as well 
as theoretical economists in the "industrial 
world", the likelihood of their speedy adoption 
is nil. So long as the economically larger and 
richer states decline to pursue global welfare 
oriented policies of this vonuity, the "second 
best" world is the only one in which African 
states can operate. Or rather they can operate 
in "seonnd best" or worse, descending to the 
"best" of stagnant, semi,subsistence neo-autarchy 
a'la Haiti or (perhaps) Burma. 
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For example the rate of growth in the standard of living 
of the groups to which politicians belong, or from which 
the derive their support, is often of more intrinsic 
concern to them than the rate of growth of national 
product as a whole.* This is not to say that politicians 
or civil servants are uninterested in, or unwilling to 
support, economic policies and programmes shown to be .; 
relevant to the attainment of socio-political objectives. 
If a government feels reasonably assured of a long term 
of office (for whatever reason), it will be willing to 
consider policies entailing short term sacrifices and 
unpopularity if it is convinced the medium and long term 
effects will be be fuller attainment of its socio-political 
ends and greater long run support. Development plans 
calling for higher short run investment out of national 
savings - public or private - and slow expansion of 
private an<a_ public consumption are of this type e.g. 
Ghana, Tanzania.** 
If economic integration is to be accepted and 
promoted by politicians'"^ must be and be shown 'to be 
relevant to their socio-political goods. As it happens, 
economic integration may be vaguely "supported" because 
it is a handy argument for some other desired end e.g. 
Malaysian or West Indian political federation with no 
real idea of what economic possibilities or pre-requisites 
for attaining them exist. Such an approach is quite as 
unlikely to lead to political or economic union as is an 
unexamined grasping for economic unification-without any 
very precise idea as to what might be gained, at what 
cost, and under which conditions. 
There are three reasons why these comments - which apply 
to applied economic programmes and policies in general 
are especially relevant to serious economic union.*** 
* This statement is not intended as a valve judgement. 
Such concern may mean a concern with greater equality 
of income distribution, broader economic participation 
and national integration necessary for long term 
growth. The soundest defense of the Kenya Plan 
follows these lines. On the other hand,a mass based 
government may engage in populist largesse while 
destroying the bases - political as well as economic -
of growth vide Peron and Goulart while a government 
responsive to a narrow politics-economic elite may follow 
policies useful to them - at least in the short run -
but against any logic.for long term growth of the 
national economy vide Nigeria, Liberia, Gabon, and 
probably the Ivory Coast. 
**If an 'feconomic union" is purely or largely>a paper 
one e.g. the West African'Customs Un-1 on^or? njji likely 
to have major effects for some years .e.g. "Cameroon -
Equatorial customs union, it may be very easy to keep 
"operating" harmoniously. No major conflicts of 
interest will arise and no state will walk out - except 
perhaps from boredom. Similarly, peculiar psgudo -
unions e.g. Sohal-Benin Entente which have very limited 
objectives and a single dominant state (Ivory Coast) 
have; very different and less broad conditions for 
viability than e.g. the East African- "Common Economy". 
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Firrt. the range and eeale of the impact of true economic 
unification is much wider than that of almost any other 
economic policy - other than the acceptance of serious 
quantitative planning cum implementation. This, more 
than incidentally, implies that it is essential for 
member plans to be harmonized or united if an economic 
union is to work: successfully. Economic policy must be 
based on clear assumptions as to the limits of the relevant 
economic unit and as to what is external to it. Moreover, 
if economic unification is meaningful, it will involve 
concentration on fewer projects of greater scale and 
efficiency made viable by increased specialization and 
higher trade flows within the union. (To balance gains 
and losses in an economic union by dividing up industries, 
balancing trade at the level of the lowest intra-market 
exporter, and increasing the exceptions to the free flow 
of goods may "preserve" the market in name but minimizes 
its value to all participants collectively, and maximizes 
it for none individually. ) 
Second, economic integration, once established to a 
significant degree, is not easily or cheaply reversible. 
To separate a unified economy into its component territorial 
units (especially if the breakup is less than amicable) 
is at least disruptive and potentially catastrophic for 
some or all of the units.* The serious economic problems 
still faced by Senegal and Congo Brazzavile flowing from 
the division of the French West and Equatorial African 
Federations, the economic crisis ensuing on the collapse 
of the Mali Federation, and the dimming of Southern 
Rhodesia's industrial sector outlook at Zambian withdrawal 
from federation illustrate this point. 
Third, economic integration movements - when effectuable -
are usually (always?) part, and often a secondary part, 
of broader socio-political movements.** The "European 
Idea" and EEC are integrally related (if separable) and 
the connections between varying expressions of (and 
support for or antipathy to) political and'economic Pan-
Africanism are even closer. This argument, of course, 
works in both directions. A political union with no 
economic relevance is unlikely to provide substantial 
enough gains in other fields to be Viable. Economic 
integration once it builds up a body of political support 
is likely - at the least - to reinforce existing 
cultural and political forces working for union. 
* If the economic union was exploitative in operation 
then some of the members may gain e.g. Zambia and Malawi 
on Central African breakup. However, even in these cases, a 
mote equitable restructuring of the union could leave 
all members economically as well or better off than 
under dissolution. 
** The possible exceptions lie in Latin America. On the 
other hand the weaknesses both of LAFTA and the 
Central American Economic Union may stem in large 
measure from the very inchoote nature of "Latin" 
or "Central" Americanism. Per-contra their rise to 
the level of serious attempt's parallels the growth 
of a real - if often vague - Latin American feeling 
of joint interests and desire for joint policy at least 
in the external policy realm. 
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If economic programmes and institutions can secure 
and maintain political approval and support only when 
seen to be relevant to the goals of government and other 
power wielding groups, a summary examination of African 
national socio-political goals and the economic policy 
means posited for their attainment is appropriate at 
this point; 
•r 
1. Economic reconstruction in the sense of reducing 
dependence on any one export, market, or firm, 
increasing national production of locally used 
products, and creating-a more national economy 
in terms of ability to take public economic decisions 
on the basis of national interests and goals rather 
than primarily in response to foreign economic 
interest group pressures; 
2. Economic expansion especially in the fields of 
modernized agriculture and of industrialization? 
3. Modernazation in terms of acquiring distinctively 
modern capital cities, industrial plants, agricultural 
machinery, and transportation equipment; 
4. Augmented standards of living and (although the 
linkage is not always clearly made) of increased 
output per head to support them; 
5. Better and more broadly available social services 
particularly education, health, and urban housing; 
6. Lessening "economic distance" between African 
and industrial (capitalist or socialist) states. 
A somewhat lesser number of African .states 
specially stress lessened economic inequality 
between individuals and regions within African 
states and within Africa. 
Ofte need not take all the professions at faoe value 
or assume a high level of operational efficiency in programme 
implementation to attribute meaning to this set of goals. 
A majority of African governments actively seek them; 
the others either passively agree with them, or feel 
forced to espouse them lest they follow in the paths of 
Abbe Youlou, President Maga, and King Parouk. In any 
event, a far reaching proposed economic programme will 
have little or no chance of serious considerations, much 
less acceptance, unless it serves and/or appears to serve 
the rapid attainment of these ends. 
The first economic prerequisite for the attainment 
of each of these ends is very easy to define (even if not 
to att-ain): rapid and sustained expansion of real 
output, defined as production for domestic use plus the 
import purchasing power of. exports. In short Africa 
is a relevant case for Dudley"Seers 1 dictum; 
"The proponents of any major economic policy measure 
in an underdeveloped economy are under an obligation to 
show how this measure will stimulate growth." 
To which one could well add, and to outline a framework 
of attainable institutions and implementation programmes 
capable of achieving the potential economic growth gains. 
To be attainable the institutions and programmes must 
be consistent with basic socio-political roods-- unlike 
recurrent studies pressing a "free enterprise", private 
sector development policy on the Ghana government - and 
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must not lead to levels of socio-political unrest which 
will halt or hamstring all government policy or lead to 
a change of government.* 
Economic integration as a serious policy proposal 
in Africa, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America must 
stand or fall on its ability to satisfy this set of 
criteria. 
No government will knowingly adopt an economic 
programme whose consequences include its own overthrowal 
(and presumptively the resersal of the programme). 
If a programme is rejected on this count even though 
its long run effects are desired, the economic civil 
servant or economists' duty is to attempt to find 
a way to alleviate short run sacrifices consistent 
with rescuing as much as possible of the long term 
objectives. Utter failure of nerve by politicians 
and unimaginativity by economic proposal formulators 
is likely to lead to short run stagnation and a 
worsening basic economic situation making needed 
initiatives over more draeonic and politically 
dangerous. A particularly appalling example is 
Ceylon which - as a result -"has from 1945 to date 
dissipated its reserves, failed to develop a viable 
economic diversification programme, and begun to'face 
massive unemployment cum falling real investment, 
import capacity, and income per head. 
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